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Abstract: This paper analyzes the ability of group members to cooperate in rent-seeking activities in a
context of between-group competition. For this purpose, we develop an infinitely repeated rent-seeking
game between two groups of different size. We first investigate Nash reversion strategies to support coop-
erative behavior in a given group before analyzing double-edge trigger strategies which have the property
that cheating on the cooperative agreement in a given group is followed by non-cooperation in this group
and cooperation in the rival group. The main conclusion is that the set of parameters for which coopera-
tion can be sustained within the larger group as a subgame perfect outcome is as large as that for which
cooperation can be sustained in the smaller group. Hence, in contrast with Olson’s (1965) celebrated
thesis but in accordance with many informal and formal observations, the larger group is as effective as
the smaller group in furthering its interest.
Keywords: Collective action, Rent-seeking, Within-group cooperation, Between-group competition, Re-
peated game.
JEL Classification: D72; D74; C72; C73
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1 Introduction
Olson’s (1965) celebrated theory argues that larger groups are less effective than smaller groups in further-
ing their interest. The reason is that the incentive to free-ride on the actions of the others is more pervasive
when group size is large due to a smaller perceived impact of individual defection. Olson’s thesis stimu-
lated an important literature and has been criticized on several fronts. First, while individuals contribute
less in large groups, this does not necessarily imply that there are less effective. Chamberlin (1974) and
McGuire (1974) first pointed out that Olson’s thesis of a negative relationship between effective collective
action and group size holds when the prize is private but is overturned when the prize is public and not
divisible among group members. Second, cooperation may be achieved in a repeated-game setup through
the use of an appropriate trigger strategy (e.g., Axelrod 1981). However, political scientists seem to agree
that decentralized strategies of reciprocity may fail to enforce cooperation in large groups where mutual
monitoring may be difficult (e.g., Taylor 1976, Olson 1982, Hardin 1982). Bendor and Mookherjee (1987)
formalize this intuition and represent ongoing collective action as a repeated prisoner’s dilemma game. In
their framework, trigger strategies are shown to be indeed less effective in inducing mutual cooperation
when group size is large or when there is imperfect monitoring. Olson’s main conclusions then reappear
in a repeated game setup regardless of the public or private nature of the collective good.
Empirically, contrary to Olson’s insight, size seems to be an asset in many situations. For instance,
Checchi and Lucifora (2002), analyzing a sample of 14 European countries, show that there is a positive
correlation between union size and union influence. Similarly, the ability of farmer’s unions to influence the
European Common Agricultural Policy is generally explained by their large size and capacity to organize
broadly both at the national and European level (e.g. Keeler 1996). The leading EU farm lobby, the Comité
des Organisations Professionnelles Agricoles (COPA), is one of the oldest and most powerful lobby groups
in Brussels, which is reflected by the resources made available to it. It has a secretariat staffed by forty-
five to fifty people (Davis 2003, 244). By comparison, the largest lobby group defending EU consumers’
interests (Bureau Européen des Unions de Consommateurs, BEUC) has a permanent staff of only ten to
fifteen in its Brussels office (Davis 2003, 245) while that available to the eight largest environmental groups
(internally referred to as the G-8) amount to no more than twenty to thirty persons (Long 1998, 110).
Finally, government transfers targeted at specific groups are, in general, increasing in the size of the groups
(see, for example, Congleton and Shugart 1990 for pensions and retirement benefits, Kristov, Lindert and
McClelland 1992 for social insurance benefits, and Potters and Sloof 1996 for a comprehensive survey on
empirical analysis of interest groups’ influence).
In fact, size seems to be an important resource especially when groups compete with each other for
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political influence or when they compete to secure a resource. For instance, Esteban and Ray (2001) notice
that the predictions of traditional collective action theory run counter to the Roman maxim: “divide and
conquer”; a strategy that proved to be successful in numberless historical circumstances. Regarding
the economic arena, many situations also involve a competition between different organizations but also
between subunits within the same private or public organization. For example, Hills and Mahoney (1978)
shows that budgeting and resource allocation in US State Universities is due to the resolution of conflicts
between academic departments rather than to an optimizing bureaucratic decision process. More recently,
Scharfstein (1998) find evidence that conflicts and influence activities affect the allocation of capital across
divisions in multi-divisional firms. If Olson’s thesis is to be accepted, we should observe that smaller
university departments or smaller divisions in conglomerates receive more - and larger ones receive less -
resources. We do not seem to observe such features in reality.1
Here, we set up a simple model of collective action which explains why larger groups may be at least as
effective as smaller groups. Our analysis is based on two key features. First, we depict collective action as
a repeated game so that within-group cooperation may be maintained through the use of a simple trigger
strategy. Second, while most collective goods theories deal with actions of a single group, we analyze the
problem of collective action in the presence of two opposing groups. In this context, free-riding might
be extremely costly since it makes non-cooperative groups more vulnerable to the actions of competing
groups, an intuition that is supported by a body of experimental evidence in social psychology.2
More specifically, we build a simple rent-seeking game à la Tullock (1980) and Nitzan (1991) where two
unequally-sized groups compete for a private prize divisible both at the group level and at the individual
level. The sum of individual efforts contributed in a group determines the proportion of the rent allocated
to each group and then, since individual contributions are not observable by anybody, each group’s share
is equally distributed among group members. In the one-shot game, because of the free-rider problem, the
more populous group spends less on rent-seeking activities and, consequently, receives a lower share of the
rent as predicted by Olson’s theory. In the repeated game, cooperation within one group, or both, can be
maintained through the use of a trigger strategy if players are sufficiently patient. Ease of cooperation, in
a particular group, is then measured by the lowest discount factor that supports the optimal level of group
1 However, Rajan, Servaes and Zingales (2000), analyzing a large sample of US firms, show that smaller divisions receive
more resources relative to their productivity and investment opportunities. But if Olson’s thesis is to be taken at face-value,
we should observe that larger units receive more resources in absolute terms.
2 Several empirical studies indeed show that tournament-based group incentives lead to higher outputs than all other
mechanisms investigated (see, e.g., Bornstein, Erev and Rozen 1990, Erev, Bornstein and Galili 1993, Bornstein, Gneezy and
Nagel 2002).
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effort as a subgame perfect outcome. Furthermore, the critical value of the discount factor associated
with a given group depends on the level of collective action of the rival group. This is because the single-
period payouts of cooperation, non-cooperation and defection in a given group depend on the outcome of
between-group competition, which in turn depends on the behavior of the members of the rival group.
The analysis focuses on the construction of two types of stationary subgame perfect equilibria (SSPE),
one in which there is cooperation within the two groups and the other in which there is cooperation within
only one group: the larger group or the smaller group. We first suppose that the members of each group
follow Friedman’s Trigger Strategies (FTSs) which use infinite Nash reversion within the corresponding
group as punishment to provide incentives. Because group members’ payoffs in a given group are contingent
on the behavior of the members of the rival group through the intergroup competition, we begin by
considering that the members of the rival group have a fixed behavior over time - they fully cooperate
or do not cooperate with each other. We then show that within-group cooperation is less difficult as the
number of fellow member rises no matter the behavior of the members of the rival group. Larger groups
are characterized both by a greater temptation to cheat and by a greater penalty associated with defection
because the free-rider problem becomes more severe in the non-cooperative equilibrium as membership
rises. In the presence of competing groups, the severity of the penalty for cheating increases more rapidly
because it makes the group more vulnerable to the actions of the rival group even though its members do
not cooperate. Holding constant the size of each group and making a comparison across groups, we also
find that the larger group can more easily sustain cooperation when there is cooperation within the smaller
group. But this result is overturned when there is non-cooperation within the rival group. Nash punishment
is less severe for the smaller group but the relative benefits of cooperation are disproportionately higher
for this group because its opponent is extremely vulnerable to the free-rider effects due to its large size.
We also show that cooperation can be more easily sustained with FTSs when facing a non-cooperative
rival group, which is rather intuitive. This actually explains why, in general, cooperation cannot be
sustained as a subgame perfect outcome using FTSs within the two groups except for a small range of
discount factors close to 1. Hence, continuing with FTSs, we would need to assume that the members
of one group never cooperate with each other. However, if there is permanent reversion to the non-
cooperative equilibrium in the first group, the members of the other group could, in their turn, to support
cooperative behavior. We thus construct Double-Edge Trigger Strategies (DETSs) which have the property
that cheating on the agreement in the cooperative group is followed by non-cooperation in this group and
cooperation in the rival group. Off the equilibrium path, the members of the rival group abide by the (new)
cooperative agreement until cheating is detected in which case they revert back to the non-cooperative
equilibrium for ever.
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Compared to the situation where the members of a given group use FTSs while the members of the
rival group never cooperate with each other, DETSs involve harsher punishments because the members of
a given group are always worse off in the presence of internal cooperation in the rival group. We indeed
show that DETSs increase the range of discount factors for which cooperative behavior can be supported
as a subgame perfect outcome in the larger group. However, the cooperation of the other group members
is not a credible threat for the members of the smaller group because, as discussed above, cooperation
(supported by Nash reversion) is more difficult to sustain in the larger group when facing a non-cooperative
rival group. We finally show that, for the same range of discount factors, cooperation can be sustained as
a SSPE either in the smaller group through FTSs or in the larger group through DETSs. Therefore, the
larger group is as likely to maintain cooperation as the smaller group.
Our paper is related to the large literature on rent-seeking theory3 and, in particular, to the analysis
of collective rent-seeking or group contests initiated by Nitzan (1991).4 This literature focuses on the
aggregate level of rent dissipation in a static setting while our paper focuses on the ability of competing
groups to overcome their free-riding problem in a repeated game setting. More closely related, in its focus,
is the work by Esteban and Ray (2001), which analyzes collective action with multiple groups in a contest
game where the contested prize has mixed public-private characteristics. They show that if the individual
cost of contributing to group action is quadratic, or more convex, then larger groups are more effective no
matter how private the prize is. This is because, in this case, the higher level of individual effort contributed
in the smaller group (due to a reduced free-rider problem) is not sufficient to counterbalance the lower
number of contributors. However, their analysis is also static and there is no scope for cooperation within
groups competing against each other.
Our analysis is also related to the literature on tacit cooperation in repeated games. Leininger and
Yang (1994) analyze a rent-seeking game in which contestants move sequentially over time. They show
that the dynamic of the rent-seeking process may involve implicit collusion with less rent dissipation than
in a static game. In the context of oligopoly, Lambson (1984, 1987) analyses the effect of an increase in the
number of firms on their ability to maintain a cooperative outcome and shows that cooperation generally
breaks down when the number of firms rises to infinity. Pecorino (1998) focuses on the effect of an increase
in the number of firms on their ability to overcome free-riding in lobbying for tariffs. He concludes that
maintaining cooperation is not necessarily more difficult as the number of firms rises. Again, the distinctive
3Following the seminal contribution of Tullock (1980), rent-seeking has been studied in various contexts such as risk
aversion (e.g. Skaperdas and Gan 1995), asymmetric information (e.g. Wärneryd 2003), asymmetric valuations (e.g. Nti
1999) or multistage contests (e.g. Gradstein and Konrad 1999 or Yildirim 2005). For a survey, see Konrad (2009).
4More recent contributions on group contests include, among others, Davis and Reilly (1999) and Baik and Lee (2001).
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feature of our work is to analyze the effect of intergroup competition on within-group coordination in a
repeated game setting.
This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we first outline a simple model of collective rent-seeking
and characterize the single-period equilibrium when the members of each group act non-cooperatively in
rent-seeking. In this Section, we also characterize group members’ payoffs under cooperation depending
on whether or not there is cooperation within the rival group. Section 3 explores the infinitely repeated
game when group members use FTSs and when they use DETSs to support cooperative behavior. Finally,
Section 4 concludes.
2 The Model
2.1 The Stage Game
We start by specifying the details of the stage game G. There are N players divided in two groups A and
B which have nA and nB members, respectively. We assume that it is prohibitively costly for individuals
to move from one group to the other. The government implements a policy generating a divisible rent
Y and decides on the division of this pie among the two groups in response to the rent-seeking pressures
and lobbying activities of the members of the groups. Let eij ∈ <+ be the rent-seeking expenditure/effort
expended, at unit cost, by member i of group j and let E ∈ <N+ be the vector of all individual rent-seeking
efforts. Following much of the contest literature, we assume that the share allocated to group j is given
by the contest success function pj (E) : <N+ → [0, 1] which has the Logit form
pj (E) =
½
Ej/ (EA +EB) ; if (EA, EB) 6= (0, 0)





eij denotes the aggregate rent-seeking expenditures of group j. Hence, a group gets a share
of the total rent that depends on the sum of expenditures of its members relative to the total expenditure.
When nobody invests anything, the rent is equally shared between the two groups.
Individual contributions cannot be observed, and so the rent appropriated by each group is equally
shared among its members. We also assume that individual preferences are represented by a twice differ-





− eij . (2)
We first analyze the one-period equilibrium outcome in which neither group exhibits any cooperation in
among its members. Since there is no equilibrium where nobody invests anything, the optimal expenditure
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¸2 Ynj = 1, k 6= j. (3)
Due to the public-good nature of this problem, first-order conditions only determine group expenditures.
We look, however, for the symmetric equilibrium such that all members in a group provide the same effort.
Let e∗∗j (for j = A,B) be the common equilibrium level of individual effort in group j. The conditions for







¤2 Ynj = 1, j = A,B, j 6= k. (4)







, j = A,B, j 6= k. (5)










, j 6= k. (6)
with (E∗∗A , E
∗∗
B ) denoting aggregate expenditures of groups A and B when there is non-cooperation within
the two groups.
The group with fewer members gets the larger share of the total rent. In addition, the share allocated
to a given group is decreasing in its size and increasing in the size of the rival group. Thus, when the
collective prize is private and divisible among group members, the negative size effect due to free-riding
dominates the positive size effect due to a larger number of contributors which is in accordance with the
traditional collective action theory. Finally, it is worth pointing out that the larger group not only ends
up with the lower share of the rent but must also divide this share by a larger number of claimants.













, j = A,B, j 6= k. (7)
In the absence of within-group cooperation, the members of the smaller group have a higher payoff than the
members of the bigger group. Furthermore, individual payoff, within each group, is falling in the number
of fellow members and increasing in the size of the rival group. This is because the free-rider problem
within a particular group becomes more severe as membership rises.
5Note that the marginal return to an additional unit of individual rent-seeking effort (as well as to an additional unit of
group rent-seeking effort) is decreasing in effort. Hence, each player’s problem is strictly concave and the first-order conditions
are both necessary and sufficient for characterizing the best-response functions of the players.
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2.2 The Efficient Level of Group Effort
We now consider a situation where there can be full within-group cooperation. In other words, the members
of at least one group jointly choose their contributions so as to maximize their aggregate welfare.
Assume first that there is cooperation within each of the two groups. In the cooperative equilibrium,
the members of group j (for j = A,B) jointly maximize Πj =
njP
i=1
πij = [pj (E)Y ]−Ej with respect to Ej .
The optimal level of aggregate expenditure of group j must then satisfy the following first-order condition
Ek
[Ej +Ek]
2Y = 1, k 6= j. (8)
Let eej (for j = A,B) be the common level of individual effort in group j when there is cooperation within
the two groups. It is easily checked that the solution of this system is
eej = Y/4nj , j = A,B. (9)
The equilibrium share allocated to each group is then pj
µeeEA, eeEB¶ = 12 for j = A,B and with µeeEA, eeEB¶
denoting aggregate expenditures of groups A and B when there is cooperation within the two groups.
Neither the sum total of individuals in both groups nor the distribution of individuals among these
groups affect aggregate rent-seeking by each group. Hence, each group obtains half of the total rent in
equilibrium. Indeed, because individual preferences are represented by a utility function that is additively
separable and linear in Y and in rent-seeking activities, within-group cooperation makes each group acting
as it was a single agent. The equilibrium utility of each group member is then
πj
µeeEj , eeEk¶ = Y
4nj
, j = A,B. (10)
Next, consider a situation in which there is cooperation in group j only. In other words: (i) the members
of group j jointly maximize
njP
i=1




























¸2Y = 1 k 6= j. (11)







¸2 Ynk = 1 j 6= k. (12)
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We focus on symmetric equilibria, where all members of the non-cooperative group make the same level
of effort. Let ej and e∗k be the cooperative and non-cooperative level of individual effort within group j














Observe that ej = £n2k/nj¤ e∗k for j 6= k. In equilibrium, the share allocated to group j is then
pj
³ eEj , E∗k´ = nknk + 1 j 6= k (15)
with
³ eEj , E∗k´ denoting aggregate expenditures when there is cooperation within group j and non-
cooperation within group k 6= j. Note that the share of the rent allocated to group j tends to 1 for
nk large.
The equilibrium utility of each individual in group j is then
πj




, j 6= k (16)
and the equilibrium utility of each individual in group k 6= j is
πk
³






By comparing the utility of each individual in each group under different scenarios, we can establish the
following Lemma, which will prove useful later.
Lemma 1 : For any nj ≥ 2 and nk ≥ 2, we have πj
³ eEj , E∗k´ > πj µeeEA, eeEB¶ and πk ³E∗k , eEj´ <
πk (E∗∗A , E
∗∗
B ) for j = A,B and j 6= k.6
The members of a given group, no matter whether they cooperate or not, have a higher (respectively lower)
payoff when facing a non-cooperative (respectively cooperative) rival group. In other words, cooperation
of the others is always detrimental to the members of a given group. First, the gains from cooperation
are larger when facing a non-cooperative rival group. Second, non-cooperation is less costly when facing a
rival group which is also vulnerable to the free-rider problem.
3 Within-Group Cooperation and Between-Group Competition
3.1 Preliminaries
We now define the discounted infinitely repeated game denoted G∞ (δ) where δ ∈ (0, 1) is the common
discount factor per period. While individual contributions cannot be observed, the aggregate level of
6All the proofs are in the Appendix.
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contributions made by each group is however perfectly observed by any member of the two groups. If

















is a history of length t. A (pure) strategy σij for player i of group





, where σtij maps
the collection of possible period-t histories into an individual contribution etij ∈ <+ for player i of group j





for j = A,B, be the strategy profile of group j members. Any strategy pro-
file σ = (σA,σB) generates the path of aggregate contributions {EtA (σ) , EtB (σ)}∞t=0 in the usual fashion:¡




= σ0 and for all t > 1, (EtA (σ) , E
t
B (σ)) = σ
t
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In period t, the induced action profiles (EtA (σ) , E
t
B (σ)) yield a payoff of π
t
ij to player i of group j. An out-
come path {EtA (σ) , EtB (σ)}∞t=0 thus implies an infinite stream of stage-game payoffs {πij (EtA (σ) , EtB (σ))}∞t=0









δtπtij , so that her payoff in G
















and to σB ; (ii) for i = 1, ..., nB, σiB is a best response to σB\i =¡
σiB, ...,σi−1B,σi+1B, ...,σnjB
¢
and to σA. A strategy profile σ is a subgame perfect equilibrium in G∞ (δ)
if σ induces a Nash equilibrium in the subgame following any history. We restrict attention to stationary
subgame perfect equilibria (SSPE), i.e., equilibria in which, after any history, a stationary profile of actions
is played thereafter.
3.2 Friedman’s Trigger Strategies
In this section, we consider that the members of group j, (j = A,B), use Friedman’s Trigger Strategies
(FTSs) in order to support cooperative behavior within their respective groups. FTSs prescribe that any
deviation from the cooperative path in group j is met with permanent reversion to the one-period symmetric
non-cooperative equilibrium within group j (Friedman 1971). Hence, with FTSs, group j players’ strategies
only depend on the history of play of the group they belong to. However, group members’ payoffs in a
given group are contingent on the behavior of the members of the rival group. Therefore, we first consider
that the members of the rival group k 6= j have a fixed behavior over time - either full cooperation or non-
cooperation - before characterizing the conditions under which within-group cooperation can be supported
as a SSPE within the two groups. It is worth pointing out that, even though the members of group k have
a fixed behavior, the collective action of group k is a best response to that of the first group (i.e. group
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j 6= k) in every period.
FTSs can be expressed as, for all i = 1, 2, ..., nj ,
σ0ij = eej (ej) if group k members play C (NC);







if Et−1j 6= eEj and if group k members play C (NC) (19)
where 0group k members play C (NC)’ means that the members of the rival group Cooperate (do Not
Cooperate) with each other.
We first establish the following Lemma.
Lemma 2 : In any period in which all group j members contribute the joint-maximizing level of efforteej (ej), each member’s best possible deviation from FTSs is to cut her contribution to 0 when there is
perpetual cooperation (non-cooperation) within group k 6= j for any nj ≥ 2 (nj ≥ 3).
Suppose first that there is perpetual cooperation within group k. In this case, the optimal deviation
payoff for a member of group j 6= k is πdj
µeeEjÂi, eeEk¶ = pj µeeEjÂi, eeEk¶ (Y/nj) where pj µeeEjÂi, eeEk¶ =h
(nj − 1)eeji / h(nj − 1)eej + nkeeki for j 6= k. Using (9), we then have
πdj
µeeEjÂi, eeEk¶ = pj µeeEjÂi, eeEk¶ Ynj = nj − 12nj − 1 Ynj . (20)
Observe that pj
µeeEjÂi, eeEk¶ increases and approaches pj µeeEj , eeEk¶ = 1/2 as nj rises.
Suppose now that there is perpetual non-cooperation within group k. In this case, the optimal deviation
payoff for a member of group j 6= k is πdj
³ eEjÂi, E∗k´ = pj ³ eEjÂi, E∗k´ (Y/nj) where pj ³ eEjÂi, E∗k´ =
[(nj − 1) ej ] / [(nj − 1) ej + nke∗k] for j 6= k. Using (13) and (14), we then have
πdj
³ eEjÂi, E∗k´ = pj ³ eEjÂi, E∗k´ Ynj = nk (nj − 1)nk (nj − 1) + nj Ynj , j 6= k. (21)
Observe that pj
³ eEjÂi, E∗k´ increases and approaches pj ³ eEj , E∗k´ (given by (15)) as nj rises. Furthermore,
pj
³ eEjÂi, E∗k´ is increasing in the size of the non-cooperative rival group.
FTSs are subgame perfect equilibrium strategies of the infinitely repeated game if and only if a single-
period deviation from the strategy (and sticking to it subsequently) after any history, is not profitable for
any member of group j. Suppose first that no single deviation has taken place in the previous periods.
FTSs then prescribe that all members of group j cooperate. As long as all players follow this prescription,
a member of group j collects, in each period, a payoff of πj
µeeEj , eeEk¶ given by (10) (πj ³ eEj, E∗k´ given by
(16)) when there is cooperation (non-cooperation) within the rival group. In contrast, suppose a member
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of group j (optimally) deviates from FTSs in period t. She then obtains, in that period, a payoff of
πdj
µeeEjÂi, eeEk¶ given by (20) (πdj ³ eEjÂi, E∗k´ given by (21)) when there is cooperation (non-cooperation)
within group k. FTSs prescribes that in the subsequent periods, the members of group j do not cooperate










given by (7)) when there is cooperation (non-cooperation) within group k. Hence, no
member of group j has an incentive to deviate from cooperation if and only if
1
1− δ πj
µeeEj , eeEk¶ ≥ πdj µeeEjÂi, eeEk¶+ δ1− δ πj ³E∗j , eEk´ (22)
when there is cooperation within group k.
The corresponding condition when there non-cooperation within group k is
1
1− δ πj
³ eEj , E∗k´ ≥ πdj ³ eEjÂi, E∗k´+ δ1− δ πj ¡E∗∗j , E∗∗k ¢ (23)
Focusing on situations where self-enforcement is a binding constraint on the abilities of the members of
group j to cooperate, the critical value of the discount parameter above which cooperation can be sustained
within group j, for j = A,B, is
δCj =
πdj
µeeEjÂ i, eeEk¶− πj µeeEj , eeEk¶
πdj
µeeEjÂi, eeEk¶− πj ³E∗j , eEk´ , j 6= k. (24)
when there is Cooperation within the rival group, and
δNj =
πdj
³ eEjÂi, E∗k´− πj ³ eEj , E∗k´
πdj
³ eEjÂi, E∗k´− πj ¡E∗∗j , E∗∗k ¢ , j 6= k. (25)
when there is Non-cooperation within the rival group.
Substitute (10), (17) and (20) into (24) to get
δCj (nj) =
(2nj − 3) (nj + 1)2
4
£
n2j (nj − 1)− 1
¤ . (26)
Observe that δCj (nj) is independent of nk as the other group acts as a single entity.
Substitute (7), (16) and (21) into (25) to get
δNj (nj , nk) =
(nj + nk)
2
[nk (nj − 2) + (nj − 1)]
(nk + 1)
2 [nj (nj + nk) (nj − 2) + nk (nj − 1) + nj ]
, j 6= k. (27)
We now study how the ability of group j to maintain a cooperative outcome is affected by an increase in its
size. Ease of cooperation in group j, as measured by δCj (nj) or δ
N
j (nj , nk), depends on how payoffs under
defection, cooperation and non-cooperation evolve as the group grows larger. This in turn commands the
incentive to cheat, the benefit from cooperation and the penalty for cheating. Observe first that an increase
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in size diminishes the per-capita value of the prize and that this affects equally the different payoffs. Indeed,
one can see that the individual payoffs, under cooperation (given by (10) and (16)), non-cooperation (given
by (17) and (7)) and defection (given by (20) and (21)), when there is respectively cooperation or non-
cooperation within the rival group, are the product of two terms, one being the per-capita value of the
total rent, i.e., Y/nj . We can then evaluate the impact of an increase in nj on δ
C
j (nj) and δ
N
j (nj , nk) in
terms of group j’s payoff (given by multiplying individual payoff by group size).
There are several effects. First, an increase in nj does not affect group j’s payoff under cooperation, as
one can see from (10) and (16). This is because the share of the rent received by group j, under cooperation,
is either equal to 1/2 or only depends on the size of the other group (when its members do not cooperate
as shown by (15)). Second, the severity of the penalty for cheating is increasing in nj because the larger
the size of group j is, the more pervasive the free-rider problem and the lower the relative effectiveness of
that group both when there is cooperation and non-cooperation within group k 6= j.7 This effect causes
δCj (nj) and δ
N
j (nj , nk) to be decreasing in nj . The remaining effect is that the temptation to cheat rises
with an increase in group size because group j’s share of the rent under defection is growing closer to
group j’s share of the rent under cooperation with an increase in nj , both when there is cooperation
and non-cooperation within group k 6= j, as one can observe from (20) and (21).8 This last effect causes
δCj (nj) and δ
N
j (nj , nk) to be increasing in nj . Hence, an increase in membership has conflicting effects on
the ability of a given group to support cooperative behavior in Nash reversion strategies, a point already
stressed by Pecorino (1998) in a different context.
The impact of an increase in nk on δ
N
j (nj , nk) (for j 6= k) also involves several effects. First, the
penalty for cheating becomes less severe because of the increased free-rider problem within the rival group
as a result of its larger size.9 Second, the temptation to cheat rises with nk because group j’s share of the
rent under defection is increasing in nk, as one can see from (21). These two effects cause δ
N
j (nj , nk) to
be increasing in nk. However, the benefits from cooperation for group j are increasing in the size of group
k 6= j because, again, the larger the size of the rival group is, the greater its collective action problem and
the higher the relative effectiveness of group j. This last effect causes δNj (nj, nk) to be decreasing in nk.
Hence, an increase in size of the non-cooperative rival group has also conflicting effects on the ability of a









eEk´ - i.e., the payoff of group j under non-cooperation when there is respectively non-cooperation and cooper-
ation within group k 6= j - are indeed both decreasing in nj .
8 It follows that the deviator’s payoff multiplied by group size - which actually does not correspond, in this case, to group
j’s payoff because the deviator has not the same payoff than non-deviators - is increasing in nj .






is indeed increasing in nk for k 6= j.
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given group to sustain within-group cooperation.
However, Lemma 3 shows that there are monotonicity results for the overall effect of nj on δ
C
j (nj) and
on δNj (nj , nk) as well as for the overall effect of nk on δ
N
j (nj , nk) (for j 6= k):






< 0 for j = A,B; (ii)
∂δNj (nj ,nk)
∂nk
< 0 for j = A,B and j 6= k.
The explanation of these results is the following. The contribution of our analysis is the study of collective
action in the presence of competing groups. In that context, the penalty for cheating is much larger than
without competition between groups. Indeed, when there is reversion to the non-cooperative outcome
within a group, the free-rider problem within that group is exploited by the competing group which
responds by increasing its rent-seeking effort so as to extract a larger share of the rent to the detriment
of the first group. Hence, the severity of the penalty for cheating associated with defection increases more
rapidly than the temptation to cheat as group size rises. In turn, cooperation is less difficult to maintain
as the number of fellow members rises both when there is cooperation and non-cooperation within the
rival group. Cooperation in group j is also less difficult to maintain as the size of the non-cooperative rival
group rises. As discussed above, when the rival group grows larger, defection is more tempting and the
penalty for cheating also becomes less severe. But, there is much to be gained from cooperation because
the group’s share of the rent approaches 1 as the rival group grows larger (as shown by (15)) as a result of
its increased collective action problem.
We now hold constant the size of each group and we determine whether home group cooperation is
more likely when facing a cooperative or non-cooperative rival group. We have:
Lemma 4: If nj ≥ 4 (for j = A,B), then δCj (nj) > δNj (nj , nk) for j = A,B.
In other words, cooperation can be more easily sustained when facing a non-cooperative rival group which
confirms the presumption that a weaker rival group reinforces the cohesion and strength of the competing
group. In fact, cooperation and non-cooperation within the rival group have opposite effects on the ability
to maintain cooperation within a given group. First, the Nash-punishment is less severe when facing a non-
cooperative rival group because, in that situation, both groups suffer from the collective action problem.
This would require a higher discount factor to sustain within-group cooperation. Another effect, however,
is that the gains from cooperation are much larger when facing a non-cooperative rival group and, hence, a
lower discount factor may be sufficient to sustain within-group cooperation. Finally, the cooperative level
of individual effort is lower with a non-cooperative rival group. This causes a lower incentive to cheat and,
hence, a lower critical discount factor to sustain cooperation in this case. According to Lemma 4, it turns
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out that a lower incentive to cheat and higher relative benefits of cooperation dominate the lower penalty
of cheating when there is non-cooperation compared to cooperation within the rival group. Intuitively, as
discussed above, the benefits from cooperation are much higher with a non-cooperative rival group.
Finally, Lemma 5 ranks the different values of the critical discount factor.
Lemma 5: If nj ≥ 4 (for j = A,B) and nA ≥ nB , then
0 < δNB (nA, nB) ≤ δNA (nA, nB) < δCA (nA) ≤ δCB (nB) < 1 (28)
The inequality δCA (nA) ≤ δCB (nB) directly follows from (i) of Lemma 3. If there is cooperation within the
two groups, each group gets half of the total rent in equilibrium. But, when there is perpetual cooperation
within the rival group, the larger group has a lower share of the rent than the smaller group if fellow
members behave non-cooperatively. Hence, the punishment being harsher, cooperation is less difficult to
sustain in group A even though defection is more tempting in this group. When there is however perpetual
non-cooperation within the rival group, cooperation is more difficult to sustain in the larger group than
in the smaller group. Indeed, while the Nash punishment is less severe for the smaller group, the gains
from cooperation are also much higher. This is because the share allocated to the cooperative group is
increasing in the size of the non-cooperative rival group. Furthermore, defection is less attractive for the
smaller group and then δNB (nA, nB) ≤ δNA (nA, nB).
Throughout the rest of the paper, we shall assume that nj ≥ 4 for j = A,B and that nA ≥ nB so that
all the Lemmata formulated above remain valid. We are now ready to state the following result:
Proposition 1: Assume that all group members adopt FTSs given by (19). Then perpetual cooperation
can be sustained within the two groups as a SSPE if and only if δ ≥ δCB (nB).
From (28), δ ≥ δCB (nB) implies that δ > δCA (nA). Hence, for any δ ≥ δCB (nB), no individual in both
groups has an incentive to deviate from the cooperative path in her group. If a deviation has taken place
within group k in the previous periods, the members of group j 6= k still have an incentive to continue
cooperating because, by Lemma 5, δ ≥ δCB (nB) implies that δ > δNj (nA, nB) for j = A,B. It follows
that for any δ ∈
³
δCB (nB) , 1
´
, perpetual cooperation within each of the two groups can be sustained as a
SSPE provided any deviations within a given group are followed by this group reverting to the one-shot
symmetric non-cooperative outcome. In that situation, the two groups neutralize each other in the contest
and each group obtains half of the total rent in every period.
If however δ < δCB (nB), then perpetual cooperation cannot be sustained as a SSPE using FTSs within
each of the two groups independently of whether the members of the rival group act cooperatively or non-
cooperatively. In particular, it is interesting to note that, for any δ ∈
³






of the smaller group (i.e., group B) but no member of the larger group (i.e., group A) has a profitable
deviation from FTSs in every subgame in which all members of each group cooperated with their fellow
members in all previous periods. Again, when facing a cooperative group, cooperation can be more easily
sustained in the larger group because reversion to non-cooperation is more costly for this group due to the
greater free-riding incentives.
More generally, for any δ < δCB (nB) and still restricting attention to FTSs, we would need to assume
that the members of group j only use FTSs to sustain within-group cooperation while the members of
group k 6= j never cooperate with each other. Clearly, in that situation, cooperation can be sustained as
a SSPE using FTSs within group j if and only if δ ≥ δNj (nA, nB).
3.3 Double-Edge Trigger Strategies
We now focus on situations where cooperative behavior can be supported as a SSPE within only one group.
With FTSs, cheating on the agreement in the cooperative group is deterred by the threat of reverting to the
non-cooperative equilibrium for the rest of time, once cheating has been detected. In any case, the members
of the rival group behave non-cooperatively and play their best response to the actions of their fellow group
members as well as to the collective action of the first group. However, from Lemma 1, reversion to the
non-cooperative equilibrium in the first group makes cooperation more profitable for any member of the
rival group. For this reason, it is only natural to investigate whether the members of the rival group can
support, in their turn, cooperative behavior through the threat of reverting back to the non-cooperative
equilibrium. If it is the case, then defection in the first group triggers both permanent reversion to the
within-group non-cooperative outcome and permanent cooperation within the rival group. This would in
turn enhance the incentives to cooperate in the first group. To account for this double edge threat to
the cooperative group, we thus introduce Double-Edge Trigger Strategies (DETSs) which constitute, we
believe, a plausible explanation for the stability of within-group cooperation in the intergroup competition.
More formally, the strategy for player i in group j, for all i = 1, 2, ..., nj , who takes a decision in period
t, is
σ0ij = ej ;





j 6= eEj , j 6= k and Eτk = E∗k , τ = 0, ..., t− 1;
σtij = e
∗
j if there exists t
0








E∗j , eEk´ , j 6= k


















³ eEj , E∗k´ , j 6= k, τ = 0, ..., t− 1, t = 1, 2, ....;
σtik = ek if Et−1j 6= eEj , j 6= k and Eτk = E∗k , τ = 0, ..., t− 1;
σtik = ek if there exists t0, with 2 ≤ t0 < t, such that ¡Eτj , Eτk¢ = ³E∗j , eEk´ , j 6= k
τ = t0, ..., t− 1, t = t0 + 1, t0 + 2....;
σtik = e
∗∗
k , otherwise. (30)
In words, in the first period - the first line of (29) and (30) - each individual in group j cooperates and
contributes the joint-welfare maximizing level of effort ej , given by (13), while the members of group k 6= j
do not cooperate and then contribute e∗k, given by (14). In any period t > 0 - the second line of (29)
and (30) - the members of group j will continue to cooperate and to contribute ej while the members
of group k will continue to behave non-cooperatively and to contribute e∗k as long as group j members
have cooperated in the past. If a member of group j deviated in period t− 1 - the third line of (29) and
(30) -, then in period t all members of group j revert to the non-cooperative level of effort e∗j and all
members of group k 6= j are called to start to cooperate with each other and to contribute the joint-welfare
maximizing level of effort ek. In any period t > 2 - the fourth line of (29) and (30) -, group j members will
not cooperate while group k members will continue to cooperate if there exists t0, with 2 ≤ t0 < t , such
that from period t0 until period t− 1, all group k members have cooperated while group j members have
not cooperated. The third and fourth lines of (29) and (30) then mean that, following a deviation from
the cooperative phase within group j, the game enters a new phase with cooperation within group k and
non-cooperation within group j. This phase lasts until a member of group k 6= j also deviates from the
cooperative level of effort. In this case - the fifth line of (29) and (30) - all members of group k revert back
to the non-cooperative outcome and contribute the non-cooperative level of effort, so that the members of
the two groups are stuck at the one-shot non-cooperative equilibrium and contribute e∗∗j and e
∗∗
k given by
(5). Observe that DETSs allow for within-group cooperation after a phase of non-cooperation but only if
group members never cooperated before.
DETSs are subgame perfect equilibrium strategies of the infinitely repeated game if and only if a single-
period deviation from the strategy (and sticking to it subsequently) after any history, is not profitable for
any member of either group. Suppose first that no single deviation has taken place in the previous periods.
DETSs then prescribe that all members of group j cooperate while the members of group k 6= j do not
cooperate. As long as all players follow this prescription, each member of group j collects a payoff of
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πj
³ eEj , E∗k´ given by (16) in each period. In contrast, suppose a member of group j (optimally) deviates
from DETSs in period t. She then obtains, in that period, a payoff of πdij
³ eEjÂi, E∗k´ given by (21). DETSs
prescribe that, in the subsequent periods, the members of group j do not cooperate while the member of
group k 6= j cooperate with each other. Hence, from period t+1 onwards, each member of group j collects
a payoff of πj
³
E∗j ,
eEk´ given by (17). It follows that no member of group j has an incentive to deviate
from within-group cooperation if
1
1− δ πj
³ eEj , E∗k´ ≥ πdj ³ eEjÂi, E∗k´+ δ1− δ πj ³E∗j , eEk´ , j 6= k. (31)
Focusing on situations where self-enforcement is a binding constraint, the critical value of the discount
parameter is
δNCj (nj , nk) =
πdj
³ eEjÂi, E∗k´− πj ³ eEj , E∗k´
πdj
³ eEjÂi, E∗k´− πj ³E∗j , eEk´ , j 6= k (32)
where the NC superscript indicates that Non-cooperation is followed by Cooperation in the other group
in case of a deviation within group j. Clearly, because cooperation of the others is always detrimental to
the members of a given group (Lemma 1), δNCj (nj , nk) is lower than δ
N
j (nj , nk), for j = A,B, which was
calculated assuming perpetual non-cooperation within the rival group.
To ensure subgame perfection, we must also verify that no player of group k 6= j has an incentive to
deviate from cooperation along the out-of-equilibrium path following a deviation within group j. From
the analysis of the previous section, we know that, when there is non-cooperation within group j, it is not
profitable for any member of group k 6= j to deviate from cooperation (provided any deviation is met with
permanent reversion to the one-shot symmetric Nash equilibrium) as long as δ ≥ δNk (nj , nk) for k 6= j.
Therefore, cooperation within group j (and non-cooperation within group k 6= j) can be sustained as a
SSPE using DETSs if and only if
δ ≥ max
n
δNCj (nj , nk) , δ
N
k (nj , nk)
o
, j 6= k. (33)
Suppose first that the members of the smaller group, i.e. group B, start by cooperating and follow the
strategy described in (29) while the members of the larger group, i.e. group A, start by not cooperating
and follow the strategy described in (30). Since DETSs involve harsher punishments than FTSs, we have
that δNCB (nA, nB) < δ
N
B (nA, nB). From (28), we also have that δ
N
A (nA, nB) ≥ δNB (nA, nB). This implies
that δNCB (nA, nB) < δ
N
A (nA, nB), and so, from (33), the following Proposition holds.
Proposition 2: Suppose that group B members start by cooperating and adopt DETSs given by (29) and
that group A members start by not cooperating and adopt DETSs given by (30). Then, cooperation only
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in the smaller group (i.e. group B) can be sustained as a SSPE if and only if δ ≥ δNA (nA, nB).
δNCB (nA, nB) is not relevant to the outcome of the game. Indeed, if cooperation can be maintained
within group A (following defection and reversion to the non-cooperative outcome within group B),
it can also be maintained within group B (when there is non-cooperation within group A) because
δNA (nA, nB) > δ
N
B (nA, nB) . Then, for any δ ≥ δNA (nA, nB), each member of group B finds it more
profitable to pursue cooperation than to deviate while the members of group A never cooperate. If how-
ever δ < δNA (nA, nB), then defection of one group B member (triggering reversion to the non-cooperative
outcome within that group) cannot credibly trigger perpetual cooperation within group A and, therefore,
DETSs do not satisfy the subgame perfection requirement. DETSs can then be compared to FTSs to yield
the following Proposition.
Proposition 3: If δ < δNA (nA, nB), DETSs with cooperation only in the smaller group (i.e., group B)
do not form a SSPE. However, if δ ≥ δNB (nA, nB) (with δNB (nA, nB) < δNA (nA, nB)), cooperation can be
sustained as a SSPE in the smaller group if its members adopt FTSs and face a non-cooperative group.
This result is somewhat counterintuitive. Because DETSs involve harsher punishments than FTSs, one
would expect that DETSs would increase the range of discount factors for which cooperative behavior can
be supported in the smaller group. This is not however the case because cooperative behavior is more diffi-
cult to support in the larger group than in the smaller group when facing a non-cooperative group (Lemma
5). Therefore, the threat of cooperation within the rival group is not effective in this case and DETSs are
simply FTSs completed with an out-of-equilibrium “perfection” constraint that further restrains the range
of discount factors for which cooperation can be supported as a SSPE in the smaller group.
We now analyze the symmetric situation where the members of the larger group, i.e. group A, start
by cooperating and follow the strategy described in (29) while the members of the smaller group, i.e.
group B, start by not cooperating and follow the strategy described in (30). Again, since DETSs involve
harsher punishments than FTSs, we have that δNCA (nA, nB) < δ
N
A (nA, nB). From (28) we also have
δNA (nA, nB) > δ
N
B (nA, nB). We then need to compare δ
NC
A (nA, nB) and δ
N
B (nA, nB) and determine which
of these critical values is smaller and which is higher. Indeed, and in contrast with the symmetric case
analyzed above, DETSs can potentially be used to support cooperative behavior in group A for some
discount parameters below δNA (nA, nB) if cooperation within group B can be supported when there is
permanent reversion to the non-cooperative outcome within group A, i.e., if δ > δNB (nA, nB).
Substitute (16), (17) and (21) into (32) to get
δNCA (nA, nB) =
nB (nA + 1)
2 [nB (nA − 2) + (nA − 1)]
(nB + 1)
2
[n2A (nAnB − 1)− nB ]
. (34)
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In contrast with δNA (nA, nB), the derivative of δ
NC
A (nA, nB) with respect to nA remains indeterminate and
we cannot rank unambiguously δNB (nA, nB) and δ
NC
A (nA, nB). However, one can establish numerically
that δNB (nA, nB) > δ
NC
A (nA, nB) as long as group size asymmetry is not too strong (see Table 1 where







Figure 1: The difference between δNB (nA, nN ) and δ
NC
A (nA, nN ).
Again, from (33), DETSs are subgame perfect equilibrium strategies only if one agent’s defection within
group A can credibly trigger cooperation within group B, hence only if δ ≥ δNB (nA, nB) > δNCA (nA, nB).
From (33), we then have the following Proposition.
Proposition 4: Suppose that group A members start by cooperating and adopt DETSs given by (29) and
that group B members start by not cooperating and adopt DETSs given by (30). Then, cooperation only
in the larger group, i.e. group A, can be sustained as a SSPE if and only if δ ≥ δNB (nA, nB).
This shows the existence of a situation symmetric to the situation in Proposition 2, except that co-
operation in the larger group can be sustained for a larger range of discount factors than coopera-
tion in the smaller group through the use of DETSs. There is indeed a range of discount factors (i.e.
δ ∈
³




) for which every member of group A has a profitable deviation from co-
operation when there is perpetual non-cooperation in group B while all members of group B find it more
profitable to enforce and to maintain cooperation in case of permanent reversion to the non-cooperative
outcome within group A. In other words, the cooperation of the others constitutes a credible threat for
the members of the larger group when they begin the infinitely repeated game by cooperating. This is not
the case for the members of the smaller group.
In the previous subsection, we have shown that cooperation is generally easier within large groups. This
is the case when we analyze the implications of increasing the size of a given group but also when making
across-groups comparisons assuming perpetual cooperation within the rival group. There is one exception.
10 In the limit i.e. when the larger group grows to infinity, we indeed have δNB (nB) − δNCA (nA, nB) < 0. We have
lim
nA→∞
δNCA (nA, nB) =
1
1+nB
on the one hand and (with the use of (27)) lim
nA→∞




The first limit is larger than the second one.
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Indeed, the smaller group can more easily sustain cooperation if we assume perpetual non-cooperation
within the larger group. But, this greater ability of the smaller group, in this particular case, turns again
to the advantage of the members of the larger group because the members of the larger group play on the
expectation that a deviation might trigger perpetual cooperation within the smaller group.
Combining Propositions 3 and 4, we also see that for the same range of discount factors, cooperation
can be sustained either in the smaller group through the use of FTSs or in the larger group through the
use of DETSs. Hence, the larger group is at least as likely to maintain within-group cooperation as the
smaller group, in which case it gets a larger share of the rent to the detriment of the smaller group.
Note, however, that when the size of the prize is constant, as it is the case in this paper, large groups
are disadvantaged in terms of individual payoff. But it might well be possible that larger groups are more
effective both in terms of aggregate levels of collective action and in terms of per-capita payoffs. In the
context of this paper, when there is cooperation within the larger group and non-cooperation within the
smaller group, individual pay-off is also higher in the larger group if group size asymmetry is not too




In this article, we develop an analysis of collective action that exhibits two central features. First, two
groups of different size compete for an exogenous rent and, second, the members of each group can sustain
within-group cooperation through the use of trigger strategies in a repeated game structure. While none
of these features is new in the collective action literature, the innovation of this paper is in putting them
together in a simple framework. We then show that increasing the size of one group (while that of the other
group is kept unchanged) decreases the minimum value of the discount factor above which cooperation
in this group is sustainable as a subgame perfect outcome. We also show that the set of parameters for
which cooperation can be maintained within the larger group as a subgame perfect outcome is as large as
that for which cooperation can be sustained in the smaller group. The crucial features driving our results
is that Nash punishment is more severe for larger groups in a context of competing groups, and that the
threat of cooperation within the rival group is a credible threat only for the members of the larger group.
The simplicity of the framework analyzed in this paper is attractive but might be criticized on several
fronts. First, we have focused on equilibria such that full cooperation within one group or both can be
sustained as a subgame perfect outcome. Alternatively, we could have considered, for a fixed value of the
discount factor, the maximal level of effort that members in a group can achieve. It is, however, important
to remember that in our analysis, the effectiveness of a group is determined not by its absolute efficiency
but by its efficiency relative to that of the other group (through the intergroup competition); hence by its
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relative efficiency at circumventing free-riding. Therefore, as long as the extent of free-riding - as measured
by the divergence between the non-cooperative level and the actual level of collective action - is increasing
in group size, the qualitative results of our rent-seeking game should continue to hold. Second, we assumed
that any deviation from the cooperative path is punished with Nash-reversion within the corresponding
group (and possibly with cooperation within the rival group). A natural extension of the present analysis
would be to consider two-phase punishment schemes à la Abreu (1986). With Abreu’s stick-and-carrot
strategies, the members of each group would conform to a “stick” phase - in which group members would
contribute less than in the one-shot game - because of the “carrot” of a subsequent return to cooperation.
We believe that the analysis of optimal punishment schemes in a setting such as ours is an interesting
question for future research.
5 Appendix
5.1 Proof of Lemma 1
Given nj ≥ 2, πj
³ eEj , E∗k´ given by (16) is equal to πj µeeEA, eeEB¶ given by (10) for nk = 1 and is increasing in
nk for nk > 1.We then have πj
³ eEj , E∗k´ > πj µeeEA, eeEB¶ for any nj ≥ 2 and nk ≥ 2. Similarly, given nk ≥ 2,
πk (E∗∗A , E
∗∗
B ) given by (7) is equal to πk
³
E∗k ,
eEj´ given by (17) for nj = 1 and is increasing in nj for nj > 1.
Hence, we have πk (E∗∗A , E
∗∗
B ) > πk
³
E∗k ,
eEj´ for any nk ≥ 2 and nj ≥ 2.
5.2 Proof of Lemma 2
Suppose first that the members of group j use FTSs to sustain cooperative behavior while there is permanent
cooperation within group k 6= j. When a person of group j defects from the cooperative agreement, the share
allocated to group j is
pj
µeeEjÂi, eeEk¶ = (nj − 1)eej + edij
(nj − 1)eej + edij + nkeek , j 6= k, (A1)
where (from (9)) eej = Y/4nj and eek = Y/4nk are the cooperative level of individual effort within group j




µeeEjÂi, eeEk¶ = ∙pj µeeEjÂi, eeEk¶Y/nj¸− edij . The first-order condition to this problem implies that
4njY
2£
(2nj − 1)Y + 4njedij
¤2 − 1 = 0. (A2)






< 0, i.e., if 4nj < (2nj − 1)2 which is indeed verified for any nj ≥ 2.
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Suppose now that the members of group j use FTSs to sustain cooperative behavior while there is permanent
non-cooperation within group k 6= j. When a person of group j defects from the cooperative agreement, the share
allocated to group j is
pj
³ eEjÂi, E∗k´ = (nj − 1) ej + edij(nj − 1) ej + edij + nke∗k j 6= k, (A3)
where ej = hnk/ (nk + 1)2i (Y/nj) (given by 13) and e∗k = h1/ (nk + 1)2i (Y/nk) (given by (14)) are respec-
tively the cooperative level of individual effort in group j and non-cooperative level of individual effort in group




³ eEjÂi, E∗k´ = hpj ³ eEjÂi, E∗k´Y/nji− edij . The first-order condition to this problem implies that
nj (nk + 1)
2
Y 2h
(nj − 1)nkY + nj (nk + 1)2 edij + njY
i2 − 1 = 0, j 6= k. (A4)
The left-hand term is decreasing in edij . The individual who defects will then cut her contribution to 0 if




< 0. This inequality reduces to nj (nk + 1)
2
< [(nj − 1)nk + nj ]2. Rearranging this






> nk/ (1 + nk) . (A5)
The right-hand term being strictly lower than 1 (because nk ≥ 2), the inequality is satisfied for any nj ≥ 3.
5.3 Proof of Lemma 3
We have that the sign of dδCj (nj)/dnj is the same as the sign of its numerator which is given by
− (3nj − 2) (nj + 1)
¡
n2j − 3nj + 2
¢
< 0. (A6)
which is indeed negative for any nj ≥ 2.
The sign of ∂δNj (nj , nk) /∂nj is the same as the sign of its numerator which can be shown to be given by




nj (nk + 1) (nj − 5) + n2k (nj − 4) + 7nk + 8
¤
+nj (nj − 1)2 + nk
¡
3n2k − 4nk − 3
¢ ¸ . (A7)
It is immediate to check that the term in brackets is positive for any nk ≥ 2 and nj ≥ 4 in which case
∂δNj (nj , nk) /∂nj < 0.
Finally, the sign of ∂δNj (nj , nk) /∂nk for j 6= k is the same as the sign of its numerator which can be shown
to be given by









j − 4n4j + 10n3j − 15n2j + 9nj − 1)
+
¡




Again, it is immediate to check that the term in brackets is positive for any nj ≥ 4. By symmetry of the model,
this proves Lemma 3.
24
5.4 Proof of Lemma 4
Let consider the case of group A. On the one hand, since δCA (nA) is decreasing in nA, δ
C
A (nA) reaches its
minimum when nA goes to infinity. In the limit we have lim
nA→∞
δCA (nA) = 1/2. On the other hand, given nB ,
the maximum of δNA (nA, nB) is obtained when the size of group A is at its minimum i.e. when nA = 4. A
sufficient condition for the inequality δNA (nA, nB) < δ
C
A (nA) to be satisfied is then δ
N
A (nA = 4, nB) < 1/2.





. Using this expression, the inequality δNA (nA = 4, nB) < 1/2,
reduces to 7n3B + 20n
2
B − 29nB − 60 > 0 which is always satisfied for any nB ≥ 4. By symmetry, we also have
δCB (nB) > δ
N
B (nA, nB) as stated in Lemma 4.
5.5 Proof of Lemma 5
By symmetry and because δCj (nj) (for j = A,B) only depends on nj and is a decreasing function, we have
δCA (nA) ≤ δCB (nB) for any nA ≥ nB . From Lemma 4, we also have δNA (nA, nB) < δCA (nA). Finally, one can
find that the sign of δNA (nA, nB)− δNB (nA, nB) is the same as the sign of
nAnB
£
n2A (nA − 3)− n2B (nB − 3) + (nA − nB) (2nAnB + 5)
¤
+n3A (nA − 4)− n3B (nB − 4) + nA (nA + 2)− nB (nB + 2) (A9)
which is strictly positive for any nA > nB (and equal to 0 for nA = nB). Hence, we also have δ
N
A (nA, nB) ≥
δNB (nA, nB) which proves Lemma 5.
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